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TITLE VII AT FORTY:
A BRIEF LOOK AT THE BIRTH, DEATH, AND
RESURRECTION
OF THE DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY
OF DISCRIMINATION'p
Robert Belton*

I. INTRODUCTION

The year 2004 witnessed the anniversaries of two major milestones
in the ongoing effort to make equality a reality in this nation. First, the
year 2004 marks the fiftieth anniversary of the 1954 decision of the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education.' In Brown, the Court, in
rejecting the "separate but equal" theory of equality, held that segregated
schools are inherently unequal.2 The "separate but equal" theory of
equality had been the constitutional theory of equality since 1896, when
the Court decided Plessy v. Ferguson.3 The conventional wisdom is that
Brown adopted a "color-blind" (and sex-blind) theory of equality.4 In a
later case, Brown II, the Court ordered the desegregation of public
schools "with all deliberate speed."5
p This article is based on a book that the author is writing on the landmark civil rights case of
Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Griggs established the doctrinal foundations
for the disparate impact theory.
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. These comments are based, in substantial
part, on my having been actively involved in the development of employment discrimination law,
first as a practitioner and then a scholar, almost from the effective date of Title VII. In the interest of
full disclosure, I point out that I had a major role in leading and shaping the NAACP Legal Defense
and Educational Fund's litigation campaign that led to the Griggs decision.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
at 495.
2. Id.
3. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
4. The genesis of the color-blind theory of equality is deemed to be Justice Harlan's dissent
in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
5. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
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The second milestone followed in the wake of the Brown decisions.
After the Brown decisions, civil rights activities, seeking to eliminate racial segregation in education, employment, housing, voting, places of
public accommodations, and political and civil rights, intensified. These
civil rights activities included sit-ins, boycotts, freedom rides, and the
1963 Civil Rights March on Washington that focused national attention
on the pervasiveness of racial discrimination in the United States.6 These
post-Brown civil rights demonstrations were the major catalyst that fueled federal legislative and administrative action, ultimately leading to
the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.'
The year 2004 also marks the fortieth anniversary of the enactment
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 is the most
important piece of civil rights legislation that Congress ever enacted to
implement our national commitment to equality in a range of activities. 8
Numerous symposia, articles, books, celebrations and commemorations have been undertaken in recognition of the fiftieth anniversary of
Brown. However, these activities and events have overshadowed the fortieth anniversary of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 9 Of the eleven titles in
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, ' Title VII has emerged as having the most
6. See, e.g., JUAN WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE: AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS 19541965 (1987). This book and its companion six-part television series chronicle the history of the civil
rights movement between the Court's 1954 decision in Brown and the passage of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965.
7. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). For a powerful narrative about the influence of international relations
and foreign affairs on civil rights polices in the United States preceding the Civil Rights Act, see
MARY L. DuDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

(2000).
8. See Hubert H. Humphrey, Preface to the First Decade of Title VlI of the Civil Rights Act:
PastDevelopments and Future Trends, 20 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 219, 219 (1976).
9. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the federal agency established by Congress to enforce Title VII, in cooperation with the American Bar Association/Equal Employment
Opportunity Committee, the District of Columbia Bar/Labor & Employment Law Section, the
Georgetown University Law Center, and the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, conducted a program in Washington, D.C., on June 22-23 and June 30, 2004 to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of Title VII. See Celebrating the 40th Anniversary of Title VII at
www.eeoc.gov/abouteeoc/40th/panel (last visited on Apr. 26, 2005).
10. Of the eleven titles, the most consequential are Titles II, VI, and VII. Title I1 prohibits
discrimination in places of public accommodations. In Title VI, Congress made broad use of its
spending powers to prohibit racial discrimination in any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. Title VII prohibits discrimination in employment by covered public and private entities because of race, color, national origin, sex, and religion. Title II covers discrimination in public
facilities; Title IV covers desegregation of public schools; Title V amends some of the previously
enacted civil rights laws; Title Vill covers voter registration and voting statistics; Title IX provides
for the intervention in civil rights cases by the Attorney General of the United States; Title X establishes the Community Relations Service to assist communities and persons on matters ofdiscrimina-
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significant impact in helping to shape the legal and policy discourse on
the meaning of equality."1 Title VII prohibits covered employers, labor
organizations, and employment agencies from discriminating against applicants and employees because of their race, color, national origin, sex,
or religion. 12 Congress established the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) to administratively enforce Title VII.

13

As origi-

nally enacted, Title VII was deemed to be a "poor enfeebled thing"1 4 because Congress initially gave the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission only the authority to seek enforcement by "informal methand persuasion" 1 5 but not the authority
ods of conference, conciliation,
16
to compel compliance.
During its first decade of enforcement, primarily through private
public interest efforts, Title VII was transformed from a "poor enfeebled
thing" into a powerful engine for social change by equalizing employment opportunities for African-Americans, women, Latinos/as and
Asian-Americans." Equally important is that the doctrinal developments
during the first decade of enforcement profoundly reshaped the discourse on the meaning of equality. Aside from Brown v. Board of Education, the single most influential civil rights case during the past forty
years that has profoundly shaped, and continues to shape, civil rights jurisprudence and the discourse on equality is Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 18
tory practices based on race, color, or national origin; and Title XI covers some miscellaneous matters.
11. ROBERT BELTON, ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
ON EQUALITY IN THE WORKPLACE 4 (2004).

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1) to (c) (3) (2000).
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-4 to 2000e-5 (2000).
14. MICHAEL I. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
205 (1966).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2000).
16. Pursuant to the 1972 amendments to Title VII, Congress finally gave the EEOC the authority to seek judicial enforcement. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 107 (1972) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(c) (2000)). For an account of the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act
of 1972, see Herbert Hill, The Equal Employment Opportunity Acts of 1964 and 1972: A Critical
Analysis of the Legislative History and Administrationof the Law, 2 INDUS. REL. L. J. 1 (1977).
17. See Robert Belton, A ComparativeReview of Public and PrivateEnforcement of Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 VAND. L. REV. 905, 924 (1978); Robert Belton, Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Decade of Private Enforcement and Judicial Developments, 20 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 225, 227 (1976)
18. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See Alfred W. Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise:Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 MICH. L. REV. 59, 62 (1972)
("Griggs is in the tradition of the great cases of constitutional and tort law which announce and ap12.
13.

ply fundamental legal principles."); HUGH DAVIS GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND

DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY 383 (1990) (asserting that the "Supreme Court's Griggs decision burst like a bombshell in 1971").

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2005

3

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 22, Iss. 2 [2005], Art. 4
434

HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 22:431

In Griggs, the Supreme Court embraced a fundamentally new theory of
discrimination-the disparate impact theory of discrimination. The disparate impact theory holds that practices and procedures that are facially
neutral in their treatment of different groups, but in fact fall more
harshly on one group, e.g., blacks or women, than another, e.g. whites or
males, and cannot be justified by business necessity, are unlawful employment practices under Title VII. 19 An important feature of the disparate impact theory is that proof of discriminatory intent is not required.
The disparate impact theory thus combats not intentional, obviously discriminatory policies, but a type of discrimination in which facially neutral practices are employed to unnecessarily and disparately exclude protected groups from employment opportunities. 20 The Griggs disparate
impact theory, as later codified by Congress in the Civil Rights Act of
1991,21 put to rest the view that evidence supporting a finding of intentional discrimination is the only way to establish a violation under civil
rights statutes.

19. After more than a decade of judicial developments under Title VII, the Supreme Court, in
InternationalBrotherhoodof Teamsters v. United States, summarized the two basic theories of discrimination on which much of the jurisprudence of employment discrimination law and civil rights
law is based-disparate treatment and disparate impact:
'Disparate treatment' ... is the most easily understood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their race, color,
sex, religion, or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can
in some situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment. See, e.g.,
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66. Undoubtedly disparate treatment was the most obvious evil Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII. See, e.g., 110 Cong. Rec. 13088 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)
("What the bill does ... is simply make it an illegal practice to use race as a factor in denying employment. It provides that men and women shall be employed on the basis of
their qualifications, not as Catholic citizens, not as Protestant citizens, not as Jewish citizens, not as colored citizens, but as citizens of the United States").
Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims that stress 'disparate
impact.' The latter involves employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and
cannot be justified by business necessity. Proof of discriminatory motive ... is not required under a disparate-impact theory.
431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (citation omitted).
See also Raytheon Co. v. Hemandez, 540 U.S. 44, 52 (2003) (The Supreme Court observed that it
"has consistently recognized a distinction between claims of discrimination based on disparate
treatment and claims of discrimination based on disparate impact.").
20. In extending the disparate impact theory to subjective criteria that have a disparate impact
on members of classes protected under Title VII, the Court observed in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank
& Trust, that "even if one assumed that [discretionary subjective decision-making] can be adequately policed through disparate treatment analysis, the problem of subconscious [racial] stereotypes and prejudices would remain." 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000).
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The story of the campaign that led to Brown and its influence in
shaping the discourse on civil rights is widely known.22 Much has been
written about Griggs, but what is not so well known is that Griggs was
the result of a legal campaign that "was almost on par with the campaign
that won Brown."23 Both of these campaigns were conducted by the
NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc. ("Legal Defense
Fund" or "Fund"). The Legal Defense Fund is considered to be the first,
and one of the most successful, public interest law firms in the history of
this nation.24 The fortieth anniversary, of Title VII is thus an appropriate
occasion on which to discuss, however briefly, the history of the Griggs
decision by identifying the genesis (or birth) of the disparate impact theory; to look at its subsequent dismantling (or death); to examine its revival (or rebirth) in the Civil Rights Act of 1991; and to comment upon
its impact and future.
II. THE BIRTH OF THE GRIGGS DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY
Griggs did not just happen. Nor was Griggs, as some have argued,
the product of the EEOC's effort, 25 or a "judicially created doctrine" that
might have had its genesis solely in constitutional law.26 On this fortieth
anniversary of Title VII, the time is long overdue to begin to set the record straight on the origins of the disparate impact theory.
"

22. The most definitive narrative of the history and legal strategies that led to the Brown story
is RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND

BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1976) (providing a view of the human and legal
drama in the years before 1954, and the step-by-step process whereby the "separate-but-equal doctrine" could be successfully challenged). See also MARK TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL
STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987) (presenting another view of the
story of the NAACP's legal campaign against segregated schools).
23. JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS
FOUGHT THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 412 (1994).

24. See Mark V. Tushnet, Making Civil Rights Law: Thurgood Marshall and the Supreme
Court, 1936-1961, 282 (1994).
25. See, e.g., Lino A. Graglia, Lessons From the Ludicrous: How Employment Laws Are Destroying the American Workplace, 2 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 129, 132 (1997) (book review).
26. See Charles A. Sullivan, The World Turned Upside Down?: DisparateImpact Claims by
White Males, 98 Nw. U. L. REV. 1505, 1506 n.6, 1507 n.9 (2004) (claiming that "[tihe Supreme
Court invented [the disparate impact theory] for Title VII cases"). If the Supreme Court "invented"
the disparate impact theory for Title VII, then it seems to logically follow that the Supreme Court
"invented" the disparate treatment theory for Title VII and the "purposeful discrimination" standard
for equal protection clause claims. I doubt that the "inventionist" theorists would argue that the
Court invented the purposeful discrimination theory. In Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976),
the Court held that a plaintiff must prove purposeful discrimination to establish a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause. The term "purposeful discrimination" is not used in the Equal Protection
Clause, and neither does the term "disparate impact" appear in Title VII prior to 1991.
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Griggs, like Brown, was the result of a litigation campaign initiated
by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund. Jack Greenberg, who, in 1961, succeeded Thurgood Marshall as the Director-Counsel of the Legal Defense
Fund, made the decision to initiate a litigation campaign to enforce Title
VII in 1964, shortly after President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 into law. 7 Unlike other titles of the Civil Rights Act,
which went into effect on July 2, 1964, Title VII did not become effective until one year later on July 2, 1965.28 The purpose of the one-year
delay was to provide a grace period for those subject to its requirements,
so they would have the opportunity to eliminate any discriminatory policies and practices that might have existed before Title VII became effective. The initial phase of the Fund's employment discrimination litigation campaign involved a group of students, community workers, and
Fund staff members. These individuals worked with established organizations, such as the NAACP, to visit black churches, black businesses,
and black communities to inform blacks of their rights under Title VII
and assist them in filing charges with the EEOC. The initial phase of the
campaign was very successful because by the end of 1965, the Fund had
been instrumental in assisting blacks in filing nearly a thousand charges
of employment discrimination with the EEOC. 29
A second phase of the litigation campaign, which overlapped with
the first phase, involved putting together the Fund's litigation team.
Greenberg assigned several attorneys who were with the Fund before Title VII became effective as the initial members of the litigation team. I
joined the Legal Defense Fund in December 1965, about six months after I had graduated from law school and less than six months after Title
VII became effective. In March 1966, Greenberg assigned to me the major responsibility of leading the Fund's nation-wide employment discrimination litigation campaign.30 Gabrielle (Gaby) Kirk McDonald,
who had graduated first in her law class at Howard University Law
School, joined the employment litigation team after she became a Fund
attorney in 1967 . 31 Gaby and I were the Fund's principal full-time attorneys on the team, but other Fund attorneys also served as counsel on
some of the employment discrimination cases. A third member of the
team was Albert J. Rosenthal, then a law professor at Columbia Law
School and also a former law clerk for Supreme Court Justice Felix
27.
28.
29.

GREENBERG, supra note 23, at 413.
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 716(a), 78 Stat. 241,266 (1964).
GREENBERG, supra note 23, at 304-05.

30. Id. at 413.
31.

Id.
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Frankfurter. 32 In addition to drafting briefs and consulting on litigation
matters, Al had the important role of pulling together a group of legal
scholars (particularly those in labor law and civil rights) and bright
young attorneys to draft pleadings, legal memoranda, discovery requests,
and appellate briefs. 3 Many of these young attorneys were associates at
some of the major law firms in New York City, and provided their services on a pro bono basis. The labor law and civil rights scholars assisted
the litigation team in thinking critically and strategically about many of
the complex interpretive statutory construction issues raised by Title VII.
A third aspect of the litigation strategy involved identifying potential cases, and /or categories of cases and issues that would advance a
programmatic, yet positive, construction of Title VII. The fundamental
goal of the litigation team was to try to establish basic legal principles
and norms that would provide broad-based relief to victims of racial discrimination in employment. In addition to having to work through a
number of procedural hurdles in order to get into federal court, the
Fund's litigation team identified early on seniority discrimination and
testing cases as major targets for litigation.34 The success of the Fund's
litigation team, particularly during the first decade of developments under Title VII, could not have been achieved without the participation of
the cadre of cooperating attorneys. This group consisted primarily of
black attorneys, most of who were in private practice in southern states.
Many of them had attended historically black undergraduate and law
schools, and were solo practitioners, or had very small and often loosely
defined law firms. Some of the older black cooperating attorneys were
themselves victims of overt racial discrimination, proving that racial discrimination extended even to the practice of law.35
One of the effects of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was to provide an
opportunity for blacks to begin to attend historically white law schools
in substantial numbers. This development is grounded in Title VI of the
Act, which prohibits discrimination by entities receiving federal funds.36
Beginning in the 1960's, a number of white law graduates, who were interested in practicing civil rights law, also became cooperating attorneys
when they joined with black legal practitioners in the South to engage in
civil rights litigation. 37 The Legal Defense Fund initiated an internship
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id. at 414.
Seeid. at416.
See generally id. at 37-41 (discussing how there were few blacks practicing law).
42 U.S.C. §2000d (2000).
GREENBERG, supra note 23, at 375-78
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program to support and encourage recent law graduates, particularly
black law graduates, to become involved in civil rights cases in southern
states.38
The most important unresolved issue in Title VII at the time it was
enacted was (and still is) the meaning of discrimination. Although Title
VII speaks in grand and majestic language by prohibiting discrimination
because of race, color, religion, sex and national origin, the statute does
not define the key term, namely, discriminate.39 There is no real dispute
that at the time Congress enacted Title VII, it intended to prohibit blatant, overt, or intentional racially discriminatory employment practices
in the private sector.40 The terms "to discriminate," "intended," and "intentionally" are used repeatedly throughout the Act. 41 The disparate
treatment theory of discrimination, now a firmly established theory in
civil rights jurisprudence, requires proof of intentional discrimination. 2
Had Congress wanted to prohibit only intentional discrimination, it
could have easily accomplished that goal by only including section
703(a)(1), which provides that it is an unlawful employment practice for
an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 4 3 But Congress
added another provision in articulating the broad and majestic mandate
of Title VII. Section 703(a)(2), provides that:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(2)
to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
status as an employee, because
of such individual's race, color, relig44
ion, sex, or national origin.
The inclusion of section 703(a)(2) raised the issue of whether Congress intended to prohibit more than intentional or disparate treatment

38. Id. at 375.
39. 42 U.S.C. §2000e(a) (2000).
40. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n. 15 (1977) ("Undoubtedly disparate treatment was the most obvious evil Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII."
(citing 110 Cong. Rec. 13088 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphreys)).
41. E.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(l), (b), (c)(1), (h), e-3(a), e-5(g).
42. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15 (1977).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
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discrimination because this section fails to mention either the term intent
or discriminate. The legislative history of Title VII, as originally enacted, is silent on the issue.4 5
The Fund's employment discrimination litigation team devoted a
substantial amount of time to thinking about this issue of Congress' intent, and questioned whether there were other theories of discrimination,
aside from intentional discrimination, that could be embraced by section
703(a)(2). One of the concerns that powerfully informed the team's
thinking about theories of discrimination was the frightening prospect
that its Title VII race discrimination cases would be decided by white
juries. Since the overwhelming number of the Fund's initial employment
discrimination cases were filed in federal courts in southern states, the
team, rightfully so, had little faith that white jurors, at least during the
early years of the enforcement of the Act, would be willing to put aside
their racial prejudices in cases involving black plaintiffs.4 6 Based on the
45. There is legislative support for the Griggs disparate impact theory in the legislative history of the 1972 amendments to Title VII:
During the preparation and presentation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, employment discrimination tended to be viewed as a series of isolated and distinguishable
events, due, for the most part, to ill-will on the part of some identifiable individual or organization .... Experts familiar with the subject generally describe the problem in terms
of "systems" and "effects" rather than simply intentional wrongs. The literature on the
subject is replete with discussions of the mechanics of seniority and lines of progression,
perpetuation of the present effects of earlier discriminatory practices through various institutional devices, and testing and validation requirements. The forms and incidents of
discrimination which the [EEOC] is required to treat are increasingly complex. Particularly to the untrained observer, their discriminatory nature may not appear obvious at
first glance. A recent striking example was provided by the [Court] in its decision in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.... where the Court held that the use of employment tests as
determinates of an applicant's job qualification, even when nondiscriminatory and applied in good faith by the employer ... was in violation of Title VII if such tests work a
discriminatory effect in hiring patterns and there is no showing of an overriding business
necessity for the use of such criteria.
H.R. REP. No. 92-238, at 8 (1971), reprinted in, 1972 U.S.C.A.N., at 2143-44. See also S. REP. No.
92-415, at 5 (1971). The Supreme Court made specific reference to this legislative history when it
noted in Connecticut v. Teal that this "history demonstrates that Congress recognized and endorsed
the disparate-impact analysis employed by the Court in Griggs." 457 U.S. 440, 447 n.8 (1982).
46. Although in the last fifty years, the number of white Americans openly espousing racial
discrimination has declined, numerous studies show that whites still harbor significant levels of
covert prejudice against racial minorities. As recently as 1990, over half the white Americans surveyed rated blacks and Latinos as less intelligent than whites, and 36% rated Asians as less intelligent than whites. Sixty-two percent rated blacks as less hard working than whites, 54% rated Latinos as less hard working, and 34% rated Asian as less hard working. See David Benjamin
Oppenheimer, Understanding Affirmative Action, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 921, 951 (1996) (reviewing studies of racial attitudes). See generally Patricia G. Devine & Andrew J. Eliot, ARE
RACIAL STEREOTYPES REALLY FADING? THE PRINCETON TRILOGY REVISITED, 21
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. BULL. 1139-50 (1995) (concluding that negative stereotypes about
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judicial demeanor of many of the southern federal judges who were on
the front line in the implementation of Brown in school desegregation
cases, the Fund's litigation team had ample reason to believe that these
same judges would be receptive to a liberal construction of Title VII,
due to their first hand experience with the disadvantages blacks faced
because of racial discrimination.47
Griggs was one of the most important cases litigated in the Fund's
nation wide litigation campaign. I served as co-counsel for the plaintiffs. 48 The fortieth anniversary of Title VII thus presents an appropriate
occasion on which to begin the process of telling the story, however
briefly, of how the disparate impact theory of discrimination evolved.
Like most of the early cases litigated under Title VII, Griggs arose
against a historical background of many, many years of widespread racial discrimination against blacks in the South. Black employees at the
Duke Power Company had been relegated to a handful of physically
demanding, low paying, and dead end jobs in the Labor Department.4 9
Some of the Griggs plaintiffs had even helped to construct the Dan River
Steam station at which they worked. The Dan River Steam Station, located on the Dan River in Eden, North Carolina, generates, transmits,
and distributes electrical power to the general public in North and South
Carolina. 50 Facilities at the Dan River Station, such as locker rooms,
showers and drinking fountains were strictly segregated by race. In
1955, some nine years before the effective date of Title VII, Duke Power
initiated a new hiring policy. Beginning in 1955, whites who applied for
employment in the racially segregated white departments had to have a
high school diploma, whereas whites who were hired before 1955 were
permitted to move from lower paying to higher paying jobs in the white
departments or transfer to jobs among departments, even though they did
not have a high school education or diploma.5

blacks as a group had not changed since the 1930s).
47. See generally JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES: THE DRAMATIC STORY OF THE SOUTHERN
JUDGES OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT WHO TRANSLATED THE SUPREME COURT'S BROWN DECISION INTO
A REVOLUTION FOR EQUALITY (1981) (discussing segregation in the South and the willingness of

Fifth Circuit judges to develop key theories to implement Brown and strike down segregation laws).
48. One of the ironies of the Griggs case is that the Duke Power Company also operated a
segregated city bus service in, among other places, High Point, N.C., and I rode on its segregated
buses in the 1940s and 1950s. Years later, I served as counsel for the plaintiffs in Griggs.
49. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 427 (1971).
50. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243, 244 (1968). See generally Robert F. Durden, Electrifying the Piedmont Carolina: The Beginning of the Duke Power Company, 1904-1977,
76 N.C. HIST. REV. 410 (1999).
51. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at427.
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On July 2, 1965, the same date on which Title VII became effective, Duke Power adopted an additional hiring requirement. After July 2,
1965, applicants for all departments, except the labor department, were
required to have both a high school diploma and passing scores on two
pen and paper tests - the Wonderlic Intelligence Test and the Bennett
Mechanical Comprehension Test. 52 To show what it deemed to be its

good faith effort to comply with Title VII, the Duke Power Company
agreed to waive the testing requirements for blacks who wanted jobs in
the historically white departments if they had or obtained a high school
diploma or its equivalent. 3
Why did Duke Power adopt the testing and high school diploma
hiring requirements? Its asserted reason at trial was that the adoption of
the new screening requirements was necessary because the company was
in the process of upgrading its facility for the nuclear energy age and this
transition demanded more qualified employees.54 However, the fact that
this new hiring policy was instituted on the same date that Title VII became effective, indicates that there were probably other reasons motivating Duke Power to adopt its new hiring criteria. The first is that the use
of these objective criteria substantially, if not entirely, eliminates discriminatory decision making. Another reason, based on economic efficiency, is that the high school diploma and testing requirements were a
very cost effective way of getting relevant and pertinent information
about job applicants. 55 In any event, these two threshold hiring requirements (presumably imposed on all employees hired after 1965), coupled
with its newly adopted policy statement that it does not discriminate on
the basis of race in the hiring of employees and applicants, were Duke
Power Company's way of attempting compliance with the recently enacted Title VII.
Griggs began in March 1966, when all fourteen of the black employees sent a written notice to Duke requesting to be considered for
jobs in some of the departments historically reserved for whites. Not satisfied with the employer's response, which was its willingness to waive
the testing requirements for a high school diploma, thirteen of the fourteen black employees filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC on
52.

The cut off scores for hiring and transfer eligibility was the median performance of high

school graduates. Thus, half of the population of high school graduates could not have qualified. Id.

at 428.
53.
54.
55.

See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1229 (4th Cir. 1970).
See id.
See generally Paul Burstein & Susan Pitchford, Social-Scientific and Legal Challenges to

Educationand Testing Requirements, 37 SOC. PROBS. 243, 244-45 (1990).
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March 15, 1966. After an investigation of the charge, the EEOC at56
tempted to conciliate the case with Duke Power, but without success.
The plaintiffs then filed suit in federal court after receiving a right-to-sue
letter from the EEOC. Duke Power denied that it had discriminated
against the plaintiffs, so the issue of discrimination vel non was joined.
The set of problems facing the parties in Griggs paralleled the set of
statutory interpretive problems that all of the parties faced in the early
Title VII cases. First, the plaintiffs had to advance a theory of discrimination. Next, they had to adduce evidence to support their theory or
theories. Finally, the plaintiffs had to be prepared to meet and rebut any
defense asserted by Duke Power. The problems facing Duke Power were
similar. Like the plaintiffs, Duke Power had to advance a theory of discrimination, evidence to support its theory, and be prepared to present a
defense should the plaintiffs succeed in persuading the trial court to
adopt their theory and the evidence supporting that theory. The primary
source on which each party had to rely was-the statute-Title VII. The
statutory provisions themselves offered little or no assistance at all on
the set of problems each side faced. Sections 703(a)(1) 57 and 706(g)
strongly supported Duke Power's argument that plaintiffs had to prove
subjective intent to discriminate because of race in order to prevail on
the liability issue. Section 706(g) provides that a court may grant appropriate relief if it "finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in
or is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice., 58 Section 703(a)(2) offered the best option to the plaintiffs because it permitted the argument that the disparate treatment theory was not the only
theory available to them to prove a violation of Title VII. 59 In addition,
section 703(h) was a provision on which both parties could rely. It provides, in relevant part, that it is not a violation of Title VII for "an employer to give and to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test provided that such test, its administration or action upon
the results is not designed, intended or used to discriminate because of
race, color, religion, sex or national origin., 60 As a defense, Duke Power
argued that the Wonderlic and Bennett Mechanical tests were "profes56.

Duke Power finally eliminated its racially segregated locker rooms, showers, and drinking

fountains shortly after a visit by the representatives from the EEOC, who visited the plant in an attempt to conciliate the case. Immediately after these facilities were desegregated, one of the plaintiffs who was assigned to clean the white locker and shower room used the shower in the white
locker room, after which white employees refused to use that shower for a period of time.
57. See supra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.

58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2000).
59. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
60.

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2000).
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sionally developed.",6 ' But the plaintiffs countered that even if the tests
were "professionally prepared," Duke nev:ertheless used them in a way
that treated the plaintiffs differently because of their race.
The case went to trial on February 6, 1968 with the fundamental issue of the appropriate theory of discrimination not having been resolved
by the parties or the court. Although the trial was conducted on two different days, the total time of trial was less than one day. None of the
plaintiffs personally testified at trial because the court allowed the depositions taken by Duke to be introduced as exhibits in the plaintiffs' casein-chief. The plaintiffs faced a dilemma because their expert witness on
testing had a major conflict and was not available to testify on the first
day of trial. The court delayed the trial for several days in order to give
the plaintiffs an opportunity to resolve this dilemma. Although their
original expert ultimately could not rearrange his schedule, the plaintiffs
were fortunate in retaining Dr. Richard Barrett, an industrial psychologist whose work focused on testing, to testify as their expert witness. I
contacted Dr. Barrett on Tuesday, February 7, 1968. He flew from New
York to Durham, North Carolina on Wednesday, February 8, 1968, to
meet with plaintiffs' counsel after reading some of the pre-trial discovery. He then testified on Thursday, February 9, 1968, after which he
immediately flew back to New York.6 2 Dr. Dannie Moffie, a professor at
the University of North Carolina, testified as Duke Power's testing expert.
A case that is now rarely discussed and too often overlooked in the
intellectual history of the disparate impact theory, but which is critical to
63
the doctrinal developments of that theory, is Quarles v. Philip Morris.
The Quarles case represents the judicial acceptance of one of the initial
theories of discrimination that the Fund's litigation team advocated as an
alternative to a pure intent standard - the present-effects-of-pastdiscrimination theory. This theory embraced both an "intent" and an "effect" standard. 64 It was the Fund's initial effort to harmonize the language of section 703(a)(1), which uses the term discriminate, and section 703(a)(2), which does not contain either the term intent or
discriminate, but speaks in terms of limiting "in any way which deprive[s] or tend[s] to deprive ...or otherwise adversely affect[s] ...65
61.

Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243, 250 (M.D.N.C. 1968).

62. See RICHARD BARRETT, CHALLENGING THE MYTHS OF FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES xi
(1998).
63. 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
64. Seeid. at510,515-16.
65. See supranotes 41-49 and accompanying text (emphasis added).
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The "past discrimination" portion of the proposed theory would require
proof of intentional discrimination and focus on the employer's overtly
discriminatory practices that resulted in a racially segregated work force,
thus embracing section 703(a)(1). 66 The "present-effects" portion of the
proposed theory would focus on a facially neutral practice that tended to
continue the effects of prior discrimination into the post-Act period, thus
embracing section 703(a)(2). 7
Quarles, like Griggs, was a case that arose in the context of the
Fund's litigation campaign and so, the plaintiffs in Griggs relied upon
Quarles' present-effects-of-past-discrimination theory.68 Quarles was
among the first in a group of cases to be tried on the merits under Title
VII, challenging a seniority system that had it origins in overt racially
discriminatory motivation prior to 1965. The employer and union in
Quarles had maintained racially discriminatory departments at the Philip
Morris cigarette manufacturing facilities in Richmond, Virginia, but they
abandoned this openly racially discriminatory practice on January 1,
1966, about six months after the effective date of Title VII. 69 Under their
new employment policy, black employees in the all-black departments
could transfer to the previously all-white departments if recommended
by their supervisors. 70 Upon transfer to the all-white departments, black
employees were treated as new employees for seniority purposes because they were not allowed to benefit from their seniority status obtained in the all-black departments. 71 Judge Butzner, the trial judge, described the effect of the new transfer policy on the employment opportunities of blacks who transferred, as follows:
The present discrimination resulting from historically segregated departments is apparent from consideration of the situation of a Negro
who has worked for ten years in the [all-black] department ... [He is
required] to sacrifice his employment seniority and take a new departmental seniority based on his transfer date. Thus a Negro with ten
years employment seniority transferring... from the [all-black] de-

66. See Quarles,279 F. Supp. at 515-16.
67. See id.
68. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243,249 (M.D.N.C. 1968).
69. The defendants in Quarles began to take steps to modify the company's rigidly racially
segregated workforce in 1955. However, these steps were not taken out because of the defendants'
own volition, but rather as a result of Presidential Executive Order No.11246, which requires govemnment contractors, such as Philip Morris, to refrain from discriminating on the basis of race.
Quarles, 279 F. Supp. at 508.
70. See id. at 512.
71. Seeid.at513.
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partment to the [all-white department] takes an entry level position
with departmental seniority lower than a white employee with years
less employment seniority. These restrictions upon the present opportunities for Negroes result from the racial pattern of the company's
employment practices prior to January 1, 1966. The restrictions do not
result from lack of merit or qualification. A transferee under any plan
must2 satisfy ability and merit requirements regardless of his senior7

ity.

The

Quarles

court

accepted

the

present-effects-of-past-

discrimination theory that the Fund's litigation team had advocated.7 3

The theory, as adopted by Quarles, established a two-prong test for a
finding of unlawful employment discrimination under Title VII. The first
prong was satisfied with evidence that the challenged employment practice antedated the effective date of Title VII and was motivated by dis-

criminatory intent to treat blacks and whites differently because of their
race. The second prong was satisfied with proof of a facially neutral
practice, operative in the post-July 2, 1965 period, that still had an74 adverse effect on blacks, as reflected in a racially stratified workforce.
The present-effects-of-past-discrimination theory attempted to accommodate several objectives. The first concern was based on the fact
that many of the early Title VII cases were brought against employers
and labor unions, particularly in southern states with long histories of
engaging in overtly racially discriminatory employment practices. Even
though many of these employers, such as Duke Power and Philip Morris,
had adopted new facially neutral employment policies after 1965, the effects of prior overt racially discriminatory practices continued to be
manifest in the post-1965 period. A second concern was whether a theory of unlawful discrimination could be teased out of the statutory provisions of Title VII that would provide plaintiffs a full and fair opportunity
to prove unlawful discrimination when proof of subjective motivation
was difficult or impossible to obtain. The new policies adopted by the
defendants in Quarles and Griggs were facially neutral, but the overarching concern of the Fund's litigation team was whether the courts
were prepared to construe either section 703(a)(1) or section 703(a)(2) as
embracing a non-intent based theory of discrimination.75 The Quarles
72. Id.
73. Seeid. at519.
74. Seeid.at517-18.
75. The Supreme Court ultimately rejected the present-effects-of-past-discrimination theory
in the seniority discrimination case of InternationalBoard of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S.
324, 357 (1977).
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court, like the parties themselves, relied on and cited both of these sections without specifically identifying whether either or both supported
the present-effects-of-past-discrimination theory.7 6 In a line of reasoning
that is remarkably similar to the one adopted by the Court in Griggs in
recognizing the disparate impact theory, the court in Quarles reasoned
that "[p]resent discrimination may be found in contractual provisions
that appear fair upon their face, but which operate77 unfairly because of
the historical discrimination that undergirds them.,
The Quarles case is also important because it established the doctrinal foundations for the business necessity defense that the Supreme
Court ultimately adopted in Griggs.78 Thus, the business necessity de79
fense in the disparate impact cases is a judicially constructed defense
that was only later statutorily endorsed by Congress. 80 This defense first
entered into the jurisprudence by way of the National Labor Relations
Act 8 l in Whitfield v. United Steelworkers of America, Local No. 2708,82
which was the major case on which the defendants in Quarles relied.
The defendants argued that the modifications they made in January 1966
supported their view that its current seniority policies were not unlawful
under Title VII because of section 703(h).83 The facts of Whitfield and
Quarleswere analogous. In Whitfield, the employees in a steel mill were
divided into two lines of progression for seniority purposes: one black,
the other white. 84 The more skilled jobs were in the white line of progression and the unskilled jobs were placed in a separate line of progression for black employees.85 In 1956, the company and the union entered
into an agreement that allowed black employees to bid for jobs in the
white line of progression as jobs became vacant; 86 they also agreed that
all new employees would begin their employment in the previously allblack department.8 7 Black employees bidding for a vacant position in the
76.
77.
78.

See Quarles,279 F. Supp. at 514.
Id. at 518 (citing NLRB v. Local 269, IBEW, 357 F.2d 51 (3rd Cir. 1966)).
See id.

79. 1 use the term "judicially constructed" to mean that the courts could not point to any specific statutory provision in Title V11 on which to ground the defense, at least before the Civil Rights
Act of 1991.
80. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000).
81. 29U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000).
82. 263 F.2d 546, 550 (5th Cir. 1959) (Whitfield arose under the NLRA and not under Title
VII.).
83. See Quarles,279 F. Supp. at 518.
84. Whitfield, 263 F.2d. at 548.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 549.
87. Id.
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all-white line of progress were required to pass a test to demonstrate
their ability to perform the job in which the vacancy existed, but white
employees who were currently working in the white department were
not required to do so, even when bidding for the same vacancy." Blacks
who were successful in passing the test had to begin at the bottom of the
seniority line in the white department and were not allowed to use their
accrued seniority to obtain jobs above the entry level.8 9
A group of black employees brought a class action against the
company and union seeking relief under the theory that the union had
breached its duty of fair representation because the new seniority arrangement still discriminated against them based on race.90 The duty of
fair representation, which the Supreme Court read into the NLRA even
though that duty was not specifically provided for in the statutory provisions, 91 holds that a union's status as the exclusive bargaining agent of a
unit of employees imposes an obligation on the union to deal fairly with
the unit employees in performing its representational functions, and that
this obligation requires the union to serve the interests of all of the
members in the unit, in good faith, without hostility or discrimination
toward any member or group of members.9" In Whitfield, the Fifth Circuit rejected the black plaintiffs' claim for a merger of the black and
white seniority lines of progress on the ground that business necessity
dictated the separate lines. 93 The court's finding of business necessity
was based on its factual determination that the white line of progress
consisted of skilled jobs, while the black line of progression consisted
only of unskilled jobs, and therefore blacks could not expect to start in
the middle of the white line of progression, even though they may have
had more seniority than some whites, because they did not have the
proper training.94 The court in Quarles distinguished Whitfield on the
grounds that:
Whitfield does not stand for the proposition that present discrimination
can be justified simply because it was caused by conditions in the past.
88.

Id.

89. Id. at 550.
90. Id. at 546-47.
91. See Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 202 (1944); Tunstall v. Bhd.
of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210, 213 (1944). Although Steele and Tunstall involve unions
certified as exclusive bargaining units under the Railway Labor Act, the same principles apply to
unions certified under the NLRA. See Whitfield, 263 F.2d at 550-51.
92. SeeVacav. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967).
93. Whitfield, 263 F.2d at 550.
94. See id.
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Present discrimination was allowed in Whitfield only because it was
rooted in the Negro employees' lack of ability and training to take
skilled jobs on the same basis as white employees. The fact that white
employees received their skill and training in a discriminatory progression line denied to the Negroes did not outweigh the fact that the Negroes were unskilled and untrained. Business necessity, not racialdisdictated the limited transfer privileges under the
crimination,
95
contract.

Duke Power Company argued that a showing of specific intent was
required for conduct to constitute discrimination. 96 However, the favorable decision in Quarles, adopting the present-effects-of-pastdiscrimination theory, strongly suggested to the Fund's litigation team
that the time might be ripe to advance the argument that specific intent
to discriminate is not required in all cases arising under Title VII. Federal courts had sent out a strong signal that they were inclined to liberally construe Title VII. 97 The Fund's litigation team determined that it
must be careful in advancing the argument that specific intent is not required in all cases brought under Title VII. Therefore, it decided to make
alternative arguments in the district court in Griggs, on the theory of liability under Title VII. Like the plaintiffs in Quarles, the Griggs plaintiffs relied upon both sections 703(a)(1) and (a)(2).98 Also, like the plaintiffs and the court in Quarles, the plaintiffs in Griggs initially relied
upon the present-effects-of-past-discrimination in their opening brief.99
The facts in Griggs fit that theory rather neatly. But unlike the post trial
brief in Quarles, here the litigation team also structured an argument that
specific intent is not required in all Title VII cases. In doing so, it relied
heavily on constitutional cases and cases arising under the National Labor Relations Act. Thus, the plaintiffs argued that specific intent to discriminate is not required to establish a violation under Title VII:
The Supreme Court has long held that the validity of an act must be
'tested by its operation and effect.' Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697
(1931). In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1962), the Supreme Court
stated: 'A law [or as here, a seniority system] non-discriminatory on its
face, may be grossly discriminatory in its operation.' This principle has

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Quarles, 279 F. Supp. at 518 (emphasis added).
See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1232 (1970).
See Belton, supra note 17, at 303.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243, 246 (M.D.N.C. 1968).
See id. at 247-49.
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been applied by the court with special vigor in determining validity of
acts which result in the denial of equal rights to Negroes.
The administrative and judicial interpretations of the National Labor
Relations Act, upon which the provisions of Title VII are in a large
measure patterned, follow this principle. Section 8(a)(3) of the
N.L.R.A. prohibits an employer from discriminating with regard to
hire, tenure, or terms and conditions of employment 'to encourage or
discourage' union membership. In Erie Resistor Co. v. N.L.R.B., 373
U.S. 221 (1963), at issue was whether an employer discriminated
within the meaning of that law by giving super-seniority to replacements for economic strikers. The employer defended granting superseniority to non-striking employees on the ground that its conduct was
not intended to discriminate against the strikers but flowed from the
necessity to keep its plant open during the strike. The N.L.R.B. found
that the employer's conduct violated Section 8(a)(3) and the Supreme
Court agreed, stating (373 U.S. at 229):
.... the employer may counter [a finding of discrimination] by
claiming that his actions were taken in the pursuit of legitimate
business ends and that his dominant purpose was not to discriminate or to invade union rights but to accomplish business objectives acceptable under the Act. Nevertheless, his conduct does
speakfor itself- it is discriminatoryand it does discourageunion
membership and whatever the claimed overriding justification
may be, it carrieswith it unavoidableconsequences which00the employer not only foresaw but which he must have intended.1
The district court issued its decision in Griggs on September 30,
1968.101 As for the theory of discrimination under Title VII, the trial
court held that specific intent is required.10 2 Based on its view of the theory of liability under Title VII, the court ruled against the plaintiffs on
the ground that they failed to carry their burden in proving that Duke
Power had intentionally discriminated against them because of their race
in violation of Title VII. 1 °3
The trial court also rejected the Quarles present-effects-of-pastdiscrimination theory on essentially two grounds. First, the court at100. Post-trial brief for plaintiffs at 33-35, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 292 F. Supp. 243
(M.D.N.C. 1968) (some citations omitted).
101. Griggs, 292 F. Supp. at 243.
102. Seeid.at251.
103. See id.
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tempted to distinguish Quarles on the ground that Philip Morris had
failed to prove a legitimate business purpose for its policy of restricting
the transfer opportunities of black employees. 10 4 Second, the district
court held that Duke Power's high school requirement served a legitimate business purpose' 0 5 because the policy was intended to assist the
company's eventual upgrade of its entire work force.'0 6 Even though the
court found that the testing requirements were never intended to measure
the ability of an employee to perform his particular job, it nevertheless
found that the use of such tests did not violate Title VII because they
07
were professionally developed within the meaning of section 703(h).
On the testing issue, the court adopted the view that any test, so long as
it satisfies some notion of being "professionally prepared," survives a
Title VII challenge because (1) "[n]owhere does the Act require that
employers ...utilize only those tests which accurately measure the ability and skills required of a particular job or group of jobs," and (2) "[a]
test which measures the level of general intelligence, but is unrelated to
the job to be performed is just as reasonably a prerequisite to hiring or
promotion as is a high school diploma."' 1 8 Although not specifically addressing the plaintiffs' argument that specific intent is not required in all
Title VII cases, the court nevertheless rejected the argument by concluding that the plaintiffs failed to prove that Duke Power had intentionally
discriminated against them because of their race. 109
The plaintiffs appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit, and the case came before a panel consisting of Judges
Boreman, Bryan, and Sobeloff. 10 Judges Boreman and Bryan had a
reputation of not being particularly sympathetic to civil rights claims.
One of his colleagues on the court of appeals, Judge Donald Russell, described Judge Boreman as "a conservative of conservatives."' " Judge
Bryan has been described as being a "legal conservative and a strict constructionist."' 12 Judge Sobeloff, on the other hand, was known as an advocate of civil rights. While serving as the Solicitor General of the
United States, Judge Sobeloff presented the federal government's argu104.

Id. at 249.

105. Id.at 251.
106. Id. at 248.
107. See id. at 250.
108.

Id.

109. Id. at 251.
110. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970).
111. Fourth Circuit History, Remembering the Fourth Circuit Judges: A History from 1941 to
1998, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 471, 482 (1998).

112. Id.at 484.
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ments on the implementation of the Brown v. Board of Education decision in Brown 11.113 In commenting on Judge Sobeloff s career as a
judge, one of his colleagues stated that:
Judge Sobeloff made great contributions toward race relations. His
opinions advocated removing the basis of racism and addressed its
immorality. From his perspective, racism was "morally and constitutionally untenable," and court decisions allowing racism to persist
would perpetuate community resistance to desegregation.
...

... He left as his legacy educated and well-reasoned opinions that
formed the basis of many of the Supreme Court's decisions 14and provided a profound and permanent influence on American law. 1
In a majority opinion authored by Judge Boreman, the Fourth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the district court
in Griggs.'15 The entire panel, in reversing the district court, endorsed
the present-effects-of-past-discrimination theory.' 1 6 Judge Boreman's
opinion for the court, however, applied the theory to the facts of the case
in a very limited way. The majority held that only those six plaintiffs
who were hired before 1955, the year Duke Power adopted the high
school diploma requirement, were entitled to recovery under the theory." 7 However, the four plaintiffs who did not have a high school education or its equivalent were not entitled to any relief. 1 8 The court explained that its reason for denying relief to these four plaintiffs was that
even though Duke Power had engaged in intentional discrimination
against all the plaintiffs before the effective date of Title VII, the evidence supported the district court judge's finding that Duke had adopted
the testing requirements without an intent to discriminate, and had a
genuine business purpose for adopting this employment practice." 9 The
panel majority also rejected the view that an employer must prove that

113. 349 U.S. 294, 297 (1955).
114. Fourth Circuit History, supra note 111, at 514.
115. Griggs, 420 F.2d at 1237.
116. Id.at 1230.
117. Id. at 1230-31.
118. Id. at 1231.
119. See id.
at 1232.
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section
an employment test is job related in order to successfully assert
120
703(h)'s statutory defense of a professionally prepared test.
Judge Sobeloff wrote a very powerful opinion, concurring, in part,
and dissenting, in part. 2 ' He agreed with Judges Boreman and Bryan in
finding that six of the plaintiffs were entitled to relief,1 22 but he reshaped
the present-effects-of-past-discrimination theory to eliminate the need
for a plaintiff to prove intentional discrimination in cases challenging facially neutral employment policies and practices.1 23 His view of the
meaning of discrimination under Title VII endorsed the view that had
been advocated by the Fund's litigation team. After specifically citing
the two substantive provisions of Title VII, sections 703(a)(1) and (a)(2),
Judge Sobeloff wrote that:
The statute is unambiguous. Overt racial discrimination in hiring and
promotion is banned. So too, the statute interdicts practices that are fair
in form but discriminatory in substance. Thus it has become well settled that "objective" or "neutral" standards that favor whites but do not
serve business needs are indubitably unlawful employment practices.
The critical inquiry is business necessity and if it cannot be shown that
an employment practice which
24 excludes blacks stems from legitimate

needs the practice must end. 1

Judge Sobeloff particularly relied upon an article written by Professors George Cooper and Richard Sobel on the legality of testing and seniority systems12 in structuring his argument t 26 Professor Cooper served
as co-counsel for the plaintiffs in Griggs in both the court of appeals and
the Supreme Court, and was principally responsible for developing the
plaintiffs' theoretical approach to the testing requirements., 27 Professor
Cooper advocated a construction of Title VII that does not always require a showing of specific intent to discriminate 128 and his views on this
issue were adopted by the Fund's litigation teams. 129

120. Id.at 1235.
121. Id.at 1237.
122. Id. (Sobeloff, J., concurring in part, and dissenting in part).
123. Id. at 1246.
124. Id. at 1238.
125. George Cooper & Richard Sobel, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A
GeneralApproach To Objective Criteriaof Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598 (1989).
126. Griggs, 420 F.2d at 1237 n.2 (citing Cooper & Sobel, supra note 125, at 1237).
127. See GREENBERG, supra note 23, at 418.
128. Cooper & Sobel, supra note 125, at 1674-76.
129. See GREENBERG, supra note 23, at 418.
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With some minor modifications in the wording, the Supreme Court,
in Griggs, endorsed Judge Sobeloff s view that specific intent, i.e., disparate treatment, is not the only theory of discrimination that is embraced in Title VII: The Court stated, "[t]he Act proscribes not only
overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice ...cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the
practice is prohibited."130 Building on his argument that Title VII "inter131
dicts practices that are fair in form but discriminatory in substance,"'
Judge Sobeloff more forcefully planted the seeds for the disparate impact theory when he argued that "the state of mind of an employer
whose policy, in practice, effects discrimination" is "irrelevant to Title
VII.' 132 Judge Sobeloff argued that his view - that specific intent is not
the only theory of discrimination under Title VII - was supported by voting rights cases precedents. In these voting rights cases, the courts, including the Supreme Court, struck down facially neutral voting requirements that some jurisdictions adopted after overtly discriminatory voting
requirements had been struck down. 133 After the Supreme Court's decision in Griggs, Judge Sobeloff again wrote another opinion
that was
34
pivotal to the maturation of the disparate impact theory.1
The opinion of Judge Sobeloff in Griggs was the deciding factor
that convinced the Legal Defense Fund to seek review by the Supreme
Court. 3 5 The Supreme Court granted certiorari,

36

but only after request-

130.
131.
132.
133.
States v.
134.

Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,431 (1971).
Griggs, 420 F.2d at 1238.
Id.at 1246.
Griggs, 420 F.2d at 1247 (citing Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145 (1965); United
Duke, 322 F.2d 759, 768 (5th Cir. 1964)).
See infra note 176-86 and accompanying text (discussing Robinson v. Lorillard Corp.,
444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971)).
135. There was some opposition in asking the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in this case.
See GEORGE COOPER & HARRIET RABB, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT LAW AND LITIGATION 497-99
(1972) (discussing a letter drafted by George Cooper, then a professor of law at Columbia Law
School, arguing that it would be unwise to file a petition for certiorari because he thought the record
was weak and that other more promising testing cases were in the litigation pipe line); HUGH DAVIS
GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY 385 (1990)
(reporting on a letter written but never sent by John Pemberton, deputy general counsel for the
EEOC, urging the Legal Defense Fund not to seek certiorari). Professor Cooper later changed his
opinion about certiorari and then played a major role in drafting the petition for certiorari and the
plaintiffs' briefs on the merits after the Court had granted certiorari.
136. The question raised in the petition for certiorari was framed in terms of the disparate impact theory ultimately endorsed by the Supreme Court in order to delink the present-effects-of-pastdiscrimination theory from a specific intent requirement:
Whether the intentional use of psychological tests and related formal education requirements as employment criteria violates the racial discrimination prohibition of Title
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ing the views of the Solicitor General. 1 37 In its decision, the Court
unanimously endorsed the position so ably articulated by Judge Sobeloff.1 38 However, the Court went one step further by specifically decoupling the present-effects-of-past discrimination theory from a specific intent requirement: "Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral
on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if
they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices."'' 39 The result in Griggs was that the Court, for the first
time in this nation's history, endorsed two theories of discrimination in
civil rights jurisprudence: disparate treatment, which requires
40 proof of
intent to discriminate, and disparate impact, which does not. 1
Until the Court's decision in Connecticut v. Teal,1 41 it was unclear
which, if not both, of the two major substantive provisions of Title VII,
section 703(a)(1) or section 703(a)(2), was the basis of the disparate impact theory. Neither the plaintiffs, the defendants, nor the courts, had
clearly identified, as a general practice, which of the two provisions supported the disparate impact theory.1 42 In Teal, decided eleven years after
Griggs, the Court held that the disparate impact theory is grounded in a
construction of 703(a)(2).143 But for the decoupling of the presenteffects-of-past discrimination from a specific intent requirement in
Griggs, it is highly likely that the disparate impact theory would not
have survived as a viable theory of discrimination after the Supreme
Court rejected the present-effects theory in Teamsters in 1977.144
III. THE MATURATION OF THE DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY
Unlike Brown, the profound impact and far-reaching effects that
Griggs would have on discriminatory practices and its influence on the
VII..., where

(1) the particular tests and standards used exclude Negroes at a high rate while having a
relatively minor effect in excluding whites, and
(2) these tests and other standards are not related to the employer's jobs.
petitionfor cert.filed, (No. 124).
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (197 1),
137. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 398 U.S. 926 (1970).
138. See Griggs,401 U.S. at 425.
139. Id. at 430.
140. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977).
141. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
142. See, e.g., Griggs, 401 U.S. at 426 n.1 (both provisions cited); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971), petitionfor cert.filed, (No. 124) (both provisions cited).
143. Teal, 457 U.S. at 448.
144. In Teamsters, the Court stated that "[w]ere it not for § 703(h), the seniority system in this
case would seem to fall under the Griggs rationale." 431 U.S. at 349.
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meaning of equality was apparent to only a small group of individuals at
the time the Court handed down the decision in 1971. Also, unlike
Brown, Griggs did not garner the big headlines in newspapers when the
decision was announced by the Court. Griggs not only revolutionized
employment discrimination law, but it also sent a powerful message to
lower courts that they should continue to liberally construe civil rights
statutes, including Title VII. Heeding this message, the lower courts began to develop a substantial body of law to support the disparate impact
theory. One of the most critically important post-Griggs cases, decided
shortly after Griggs was handed down, was Robinson v. Lorillard
Corp.145 Robinson began to put teeth in the disparate impact theory. The
Supreme Court did not flesh out the business necessity defense in
Griggs, except to allocate the burden of pleading and persuasion to the
defendant.1 46 In Robinson, Judge Sobeloff again wrote a major Title VII
opinion, in which he adopted a stringent test of business necessity with
the aim of assuring that Title VII would be a "potent tool" for making
equality a reality in the work place. 147 Robinson was a seniority discrimination case litigated by the Fund and tried before Judge Gordon,
the trial court judge in Griggs.
The Fourth Circuit handed down its decision in Griggs about three
months before Judge Gordon issued his opinion in Robinson on March
12, 1970.14' Therefore, Judge Gordon had to apply the 'present-effectsof-past discrimination' theory in Robinson because the court of appeals
had reversed his contrary ruling on this theory in Griggs.149 Judge
Gordon first found that the seniority system was unlawful under the present-effects theory. 50 The defendants argued that the departmental seniority system at issue was justified by business necessity because it was
an efficient way of identifying qualified employees for promotions
within each department who had the necessary skill set for advancement
to the next higher job.' 51 The plaintiffs argued for a company-wide seniority system that would more quickly redress the continuing racial discrimination
on which the departmental seniority system was con52
structed.1
145.
146.
147.
148.

444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971).
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
See Robinson, 444 F.2d at 798.
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 319 F. Supp. 835, 835 (M.D.N.C. 1970).

149. See supra notes 127-35 and accompanying text (discussing the majority opinion of the
Fourth Circuit in Griggs).
150. Robinson, 319 F. Supp. at 841-42.
151. See Robinson, 444 F.2d at 799.
152. See, e.g., Robinson, 319 F. Supp. at 838.
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Judge Gordon considered two alternative theories of the business
necessity test. 53 The first theory, he reasoned, offered no absolution for
an employment practice that operates in a discriminatory manner, even if
it serves a valid business purpose.1 54 Under this theory, Judge Gordon
easily rejected the defendants' business purpose argument.' 55 The second
theory involved a balancing test: The defendants' asserted business reason is to be balanced against the "anti-value of discrimination or its continuing effects."'' 56 Judge Gordon, opting to apply the balancing test theory of business necessity, found that the defendants' asserted business
purpose did not outweigh the plaintiffs' statutory protection against racial discrimination. 57 The court then entered
judgment in favor of the
58
plaintiffs and awarded them partial relief. 1
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding of liability
in an opinion authored by Judge Sobeloff. He grounded his test of business necessity, in substantial part, on the Supreme Court decision in
Griggs:
Collectively these cases conclusively establish that the applicable test
is not merely whether there exists a business purpose for adhering to a
challenged practice. The test is whether there exists an overriding legitimate business purpose such that the practice is necessary to the safe
and efficient operation of the business. Thus, the business purpose
must be sufficiently compelling to override any racial impact; the challenged practice must effectively carry out the business purpose it is alleged to serve; and there must be available no acceptable alternative
policies or practices which would better accomplish the business purpose advanced,
or accomplish it equally well with a lesser differential
159
racial impact.

Other courts soon adopted Judge Sobeloff's stringent test of business necessity. 60 To carry the burden of persuasion on the business ne153.

Id.at 841.

154.
155.

Id.

Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 842.
158. Id. at 843.
159. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971); Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969). Subsequently, in the wake of
later Supreme Court decisions, the lower courts began to retreat from a strict test of business necessity. See, e.g., Contreras v. City of Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1276 (9th Cir. 1981) (ruling that the
employer was not required to show that the policy was absolutely necessary for the operation of the
business).
160. See, e.g., Sagers v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 529 F.2d 721, 730 n.18 (5th Cir. 1976) (not-
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cessity defense, employers were required to validate employment policies and practices that had an adverse impact on groups and individuals
who are the principle beneficiaries of Title VII. 16 1 As a plurality of the
Court correctly recognized in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank 63
and Trust
Co.,1 62 validation can be difficult, costly and time consuming.

The expansive role of statistical evidence that the courts adopted
also put teeth into the disparate impact theory. It is difficult, if not impossible, to prove a claim under the disparate impact theory without the
statistical evidence. In the Teamsters trilogy, a trio of cases decided in
1977, the Supreme Court broadly endorsed the use of statistical evidence
to prove employment discrimination claims.'64 Defining the role of statistical evidence in Title VII was not an easy task because almost from
the effective date of the Act, defendants argued that section 7030) barred
the use of statistical evidence. 65 Section 7030), which some deem to be
an anti-preferential treatment provision, provides that employers are not
required to "grant preferential treatment to any individual or any group"
because of an imbalance between the protected class members under Title VII and the percentage of protected class members in the employer's
workforce. 166 In the Teamsters trilogy, the Court rejected the employers'
argument that 7030) bars the use of statistical evidence to prove liability
in employment discrimination litigation,167 and in doing so, it endorsed 68a
rather liberal view of the role and relevancy of statistical evidence.

ing that the test applied is a "strict one"); Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870, 879
(6th Cir. 1973) (finding that the lower court failed to properly apply the test of business necessity as
developed in Robinson); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971)
(requiring a business necessity test that not only asks whether the business practice serves a legitimate interest essential to the firm's goal, but also whether a reasonable alternative was available).
See generally Note, Business Necessity Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A NoAlternative Approach, 84 YALE L.J. 98, 98-99 (1974) (discussing the nature of the business necessity test under Title VII).
161. See Contreras, 656 F.2d at 1281 (explaining that validation requires a study to show a
relationship between the selection criteria and job requirements).
162. 487 U.S. 977 (1988) (plurality opinion).
163. Id. at 998.
164. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433
U.S. 299 (1977); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
165. See, e.g., Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339 n.20.
166. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (2000).
167. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 339-40 n.20; see also HazelwoodSch. Dist., 433 U.S. at 307.
168. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 433 U.S. at 313 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("It should be
plain ... that the liberal substantive standards for establishing a Title VII violation, including the
usefulness of statistical proof, are reconfirmed.").
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The Court's decision in the Teamsters trilogy of cases provided plaintiffs
169
in employment discrimination cases with a powerful evidentiary tool.
The Fund's litigation team took a lead role in making effective the
use of class actions in employment discrimination cases, which it used in
both the pre-Brown and post-Brown school desegregation cases.170 Perhaps one of the main reasons courts were more willing to recognize class
action claims in the school desegregation cases was that the Fund was
not seeking monetary damages on behalf of the plaintiffs' class, only injunctive relief. Unlike the equal protection clause, on which the school
desegregation cases were brought, section 706(g) of Title VII provides
for monetary relief in the form of back pay.17 ' The availability of back
pay presented two issues. The first was whether courts would allow class
actions in cases where the plaintiffs sought back pay. 7 2 The second was
whether a claim for back pay was a legal claim, and thus entitled the defendant to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States. 173 Title VII was silent on both, and both issues presented the Fund's litigation team with potentially formidable barriers in
its aim to maximize limited financial and human resources and to provide relief to large numbers of discriminates who otherwise would not
be able to bring actions. Whether the courts would be as receptive to
class action employment discrimination claims was far from clear, and
resisted efforts by plaintiffs to bring class actions
defendants vigorously
17 4
VII.
Title
under
A development that preceded Griggs, but also one that took on
added significance after that case, was the willingness of courts to allow
broad-based class actions. Broad-based class actions allowed organizations such as the Legal Defense Fund to use precious limited resources
to provide representation to large groups of individuals who otherwise
would be unable to finance such costly litigation or even find attorneys
willing to represent them (since only small number of attorneys were
willing to become involved in employment discrimination litigation).
The Fund's litigation team pushed both the class action and back
pay issues. The first breakthrough was on the class action issue. In a

169. See, e.g., id. at 307-13.
170. See GREENBERG, supra note 23, at 415-16.
171. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2000).
172. See Robinson v. Lorillard, 444 F.2d 791, 802 (4th Cir. 1971).
173. The Seventh Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "[iun [s]uits at common law,
where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right to trial by jury [is] preserved .... U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
174. See, e.g., Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 33-34 (5th Cir. 1968).
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1966 case, decided less than one year after the effective date of Title
v.
VII, the Fund was successful in convincing the district court in Hall176
175
Werthan Bag Corp., to allow the case to proceed as a class action.
The court held, among other reasons, that "[r]acial discrimination is by
definition a class discrimination. If it exists, it applies throughout the
class ....And whether the Damoclean threat of a racially discriminatory policy hangs over the racial class is a question of fact common to all
the members of the class."' 177 Hall was a major legal victory for the Fund
and set the stage for broad recognition of employment discrimination
class actions. Although the law on class actions in employment discrimination was well-settled by 1971,178 the Hall development took on
Title VII a potent tool for
added significance after Griggs by making
179
place.
work
the
in
equality
achieving
The issue of whether a defendant is entitled to a jury trial in Title80
VII cases, where the plaintiffs seek back pay under section 706(g),'
was raised in a number of the early Title VII cases, particularly those
where plaintiffs sought class action certification. 18 1 The defendants argued that they were entitled to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment
since monetary damages available under section 706(g) must be deemed
to be legal in nature. The law was (and still is) well settled that a jury
trial attaches as a matter of right under the Seventh Amendment to any

175. 251 F. Supp. 184 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
176. Id. at 188.
177. Id.at 186.
178. See, e.g., Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1124 (5th Cir. 1969).
179. The courts recognized the right of private plaintiffs to bring class actions based upon three
interrelated theories. The first is the "private attorney's general" theory, which holds that a private
action is more than a private claim by a single individual seeking to vindicate purely private rights
because "[w]hether in name or not, the suit is perforce a sort of class action for fellow employees
similarly situated." Jenkins at 33. Second, the court adopted the "across-the-board" theory under
which a single plaintiff or a representative group of plaintiffs were allowed to represented all similarly situated persons affected by an employer's discriminatory practices. Id. The rationale for the
"across-the-board" class actions was that they were necessary to effectuate the broad remedial purposes of antidiscrimination statutes. See, e.g., Senter v. Gen. Motors Corp., 532 F.2d 511, 524 (6th
Cir. 1976). The seminal case adopting the "across-the-board" class action theory is Johnson, 417
F.2d at 1124. Third, the courts held that class actions were appropriate from a policy perspective
because this mode of adjudication promotes judicial economy, eliminates the possibility of inconsistent and varying outcomes, and protects the employer from the possible burden of defending multiple lawsuits challenging the same employment practice. See, e.g., Mack v. Gen. Elec. Co., 329 F.
Supp. 72, 74-75 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
180. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (2000).
181. See, e.g. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 442-43 (1975) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring).
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legal claim, 2even if both legal and equitable claims are sought in the
18
same case.
The Fund's litigation team decided to actively pursue monetary
damages in the employment discrimination cases on the theory that the
possibility of having substantial monetary damages imposed upon discriminating employers would induce such employers to begin taking
voluntary measures to eliminate unlawful discriminatory employment
practices. In Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 183 the Supreme Court finally accepted this view of the purpose of back pay.' 84 In order to avoid
the prospect of trying discrimination cases, and particularly race discrimination cases, before potentially hostile white jurors, the Fund's litigation team argued that all forms of relief under Title VII, including
monetary relief in the form of back pay, should be deemed equitable, so
that the defendants were not entitled to a jury trial. The lower courts
agreed with the plaintiffs' argument,1 85 and the Supreme Court agreed as
well, holding in Albemarle PaperCo. that all forms of relief under Title
VII, including back pay, are equitable in nature.1 86 The Court also established a strong presumption that all members of the plaintiffs' class
should be awarded back pay if they have suffered economic injury because of a defendant's unlawful discrimination, and that this presumption is rebutted only upon a proof that the denial of back pay would not
frustrate the national mandate of eradicating discrimination in employment throughout the country.1 87 In a later case, the Court held that the

182. See, e.g., Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 471 (1962); Beacon Theatres v.
Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 508 (1959).
183. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
184. The Supreme Court deemed the argument to be meritorious in Albemarle Paper Co.,
when it relied upon Griggs to support its ruling on back pay:
The District Court's decision must therefore be measured against the purposes which inform Title VII. As the Court observed in Griggs v. Duke Power Co_,.. the primary objective was a prophylactic one:
"It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that
have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over
other employees."
Backpay has an obvious connection with this purpose. If employers faced only the prospect of an injunctive order, they would have little incentive to shun practices of dubious
legality. It is the reasonably certain prospect of a backpay award that "providels] the spur
or catalyst which causes employers and unions to self-examine and to self-evaluate their
employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges of
an unfortunate and ignominious page in this country's history."
Id. at 417-18 (citation omitted).
185. See, e.g., Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969).
186. Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 418.
187. Id.at421.
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presumptive entitlement to back pay88 is seldom overcome once the court
has found unlawful discrimination.'
Another major development that made the impact theory a potent
tool to remedy employment discrimination was when, in the wake of the
Supreme Court decisions in Albemarle Paper Co. and Franks v. Bowman TransportationCo., 8 9 courts began to develop a substantial body of
law on various forms of appropriate relief, such as back pay, front pay,
reinstatement, and injunctive relief. 190 The twin developments of a postGriggs emergence of a coherent body of substantive law on disparate
impact and the emergence of "rightful place" and "make-whole" monetary remedies sent a clear message to defendants in employment discrimination cases: either affirmatively prove that challenged employment practices were mandated by business necessity or face a substantial
risk of liability and the imposition of remediation costs imposed by
courts. 91 One response of employers to the formidable mandate created
by the twin post-Griggsdevelopments was to seek relief from the federal
government, i.e., the EEOC, the Department of Justice and the federal
Civil Service Commission. 92 These federal agencies, after resolving
some policy differences, endorsed the bottom-line defense,' 93 which
holds that an employer's policies or practices that have an adverse effect
on a protected class would not result in a finding of a violation by federal agencies if the bottom line result in the decision making process did
not show disparate impact, even if one of the criteria used in the process
did have a disparate impact on a protected class. 194 The Supreme Court
188.

Los Angeles Dep't of Water& Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 719 (1978).

189. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
190. See generally ROBERT BELTON, REMEDIES IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
(1992) (covering a broad range of make-whole and rightfully place forms of relief).
191. See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Trust Co., 487 U.S. 977, 1006 (1988) (plurality opinion).
192. See generally Alfred W. Blumrosen, The Group Interest Concept, Employment Discrimination, and Legislative Intent: The Fallacy of Connecticut v. Teal, 20 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 99

(1983).
193.
194.

See id.
The following is a simple illustration of the bottom-line approach. The employer bases its

hiring decisions on the applicant's score on an employment examination and on the results of an
interview used to evaluate subjective criteria. The following table shows the results of each step of
the hiring process for black and white applicants.
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rejected the bottom-line defense in Connecticut v. Teal,195 holding that it
does not preclude a plaintiff or a class of plaintiffs from establishing a
nor may a defendant raise it as a deprima facie case of discrimination,
96
case.1
facie
prima
a
to
fense
Another response was that employers, in adopting affirmative action policies, began to take into account race or sex as a factor in making
employment decisions. By taking race or sex into account, if an employer could reduce the statistical disparity between the number of qualified blacks and women in the relevant labor market and the number of
blacks and women in its workforce, then the employer was in a good position to successfully defend a disparate impact claim. The Supreme
Court provided support for employers' reliance on affirmative action
plans in certain limited circumstances in United Steelworkers v. Weber.'97 In Weber, the employer, Kaiser Aluminum, and a union, the
Steelworkers, adopted an affirmative action plan, pursuant to which they
agreed to establish a program to train production workers to be apprentices to fill craft openings. 198 Selection of apprenticeship trainees would
be made on the basis of seniority, with the proviso that fifty percent of
employees selected would be black and fifty percent would be white.'99
The district court found that the defendants adopted the plan to satisfy
their obligation under Executive Order 11246 and to avoid "vexatious
litigation by minority employees., 20 0 The same two defendants had been

No.of

Applicants
No. Failed
the Test
No.

Blacks

Whites

100

100

60

10

40

90

10

10

Interviewed
No. Offered
Employment

Although blacks are disproportionately eliminated by the test, the final selection process,

based on the interviews, shows that black applicants are offered employment at a rate equal to
white applicants. The bottom-line defense requires that, in determining whether disparate impact has been shown, one must look to the bottom line of the selection process-here the relative proportion of applicants of each race offered employment-rather than the adverse impact
of a specific criterion that is used in the course of selection process.
195.

457 U.S. 440 (1982).

196. ld. at 442.
197.
198.

443 U.S. 193 (1979).
Id. at 198-99.

199. Id. at 99.
200. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761, 765 (E.D. La. 1976), aff'd,
563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd and remanded sub noa. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443
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sued successfully in an earlier employment discrimination case. 20 The
central issue in Weber was whether the defendants could lawfully take
reasonable race-conscious action to remedy the effects of apparent or potential violations of Title VII, without admitting and proving that it had
previously engaged in racial discrimination.2 °2
In Weber, the Court held that an affirmative action policy survives a
Title VII challenge if it satisfies a three-pronged test. 2° 3 First, the purpose of the affirmative action plan must be to "break down old patterns
of racial segregation and hierarchy; ' '2°4 second, the plan must not "unnecessarily trammel the interest of white employees; '20 5 and third, the
measure" that is not "intended to maintain raplan must be a20 "temporary
6
cial balance.,
The post-Griggs developments, as described above, effectuated the
dream of Judge Sobeloff that Title VII should be construed so that it
"remain[s] a potent tool for equalization of employment opportunity" for
all of those who fall within its protection.20 7
IV. THE "DEATH" OF THE DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY
As the membership of the Supreme Court began to change, so too
did the jurisprudence on Title VII. Many date the demise of the Griggs
disparate impact theory with the Court's 1989 decision in Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio. 20 8 My assessment is that the onset of the Court's
dismantling of the legal edifice surrounding Griggs began with the
Court's 1976 decision in Washington v Davis.20 9 In that case, the Court
held that the disparate impact theory is inapplicable to discrimination
claims based solely on the Equal Protection Clause; purposeful or intentional discrimination must be proven in an Equal Protection Clause
U.S. 193 (1979); see also Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 234 (5th Cit.
1977) (Wisdom, J., dissenting) (noting that the defendants were facing "arguable violations" of Title
VII), rev'd and remandedsub nom. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
201. See Parson v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 575 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 1978).
202. The Court framed the question as "whether Congress, in Title VII... left employers and
unions in the private sector free to take such race-conscious steps to eliminate manifest racial imbalances in traditionally segregated job categories." Weber, 443 U.S. at 197.
203. See id. at 208.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1238 (4th Cir. 1970) (Sobeloff, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
208. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
209. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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claim. 210 Washington v. Davis can be seen as the opening legal salvo that
ultimately reached its intended outcome in Wards Cove, where the Supreme Court completely dismantled the disparate impact theory.2 11
In the Term following the Washington v. Davis decision, the Court
continued to dismantle the legal edifice that supported the Griggs disparate impact theory. There were very few dissents in the Court's Title VII
cases prior to its 1976 Term.2 12 In a series of cases decided during its
1976 Term, most of which had dissenting opinions, the Court, inter alia,
held that discrimination because of pregnancy is not sex discrimination; 21 3 began to limit the reach of the "continuing violation" theory to
determine whether a charge had been timely filed with the EEOC;214 began to endorse more stringent rules on certifying class actions; 215 rejected the present-effects-of-past discrimination as a theory of discrimination; 216 and narrowly construed the reasonable accommodation
provision for religious discrimination claims.2 17 The Court in these cases
established a trend of narrowly construing issues arising under Title VII.
Although, the Court laid the foundations for dismantling Griggs'
disparate impact theory in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust,2 18 it did
not have the votes to actually do so because Judge Kennedy had not yet
joined the Court. In Watson, the plurality adopted the view that the disparate impact theory is, in effect, the disparate treatment theory masquerading in drag:
The distinguishing features of the factual issues that typically dominate
in disparate impact cases do not imply that the ultimate legal issue is
210. Seeid. at238-39.
211. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 650-51.
212. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp.
Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976); Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820 (1976); Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S.
840 (1976); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737 (1976); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405 (1975); Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975); Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86, 96-99 (1973)
(Douglas, J., dissenting); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 793 (1973) (unanimous); Love v. Pullman, 404 U.S. 522, 522 (1972) (7-0 decision); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 425 (1971) (8-0 decision); Phillips v Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544-47 (1971)
(Marshall, J., concurring); Crosslin v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 400 U.S. 1004, 1004-05
(1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
213. See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 145-46 (1976). Congress overturned Gilbert
in the 1978 amendments to Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-k (2000).
214. See United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 560 (1977).
215. See E. Tex. Motor Freight, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 405-06 (1977).
216. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 341 (1977).
217. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 85 (1977).
218. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
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different than in cases where disparate treatment analysis is used. (citation omitted). Nor do we think it is appropriate to hold a defendant liable for unintentional discrimination on the basis of less evidence than
is required to prove intentional discrimination. Rather, the necessary
premise of the disparate impact approach is that some employment
practices, adopted without a deliberately discriminatory motive, may, in
operation be functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination.
The plurality in Watson also seemed to express a clear hostility to
the disparate impact theory because, in its view, the liberal use of statistics and the rigorous business necessity test inevitably left defendants no
choice but to adopt racial and sexual quotas in order to avoid liability
under the theory:
We agree that the inevitable focus on statistics in disparate impact
cases could put undue pressure on employers to adopt inappropriate
prophylactic measures. It is completely unrealistic to assume that
unlawful discrimination is the sole cause of people failing to gravitate
to jobs and employers in accord with the laws of chance. (citation
omitted). It would be equally unrealistic to suppose that employers can
eliminate, or discover and explain, the myriad of innocent causes that
may lead to statistical imbalances in the composition of their work
forces. Congress has specifically provided [in section 7030) of Title
VIII that employers are not required to avoid "disparate impact . . ,,220
The Court went on to say that:
Preferential treatment and the use of quotas by public employers subject to Title VII can violate the Constitution (citation omitted), and it
has long been recognized that legal rules leaving any class of employers with "little choice" but to adopt such measures would be "far from
the intent of Title VII." (citation omitted). Respondent and the United
States are thus correct when they argue that extending disparate impact
analysis to subjective employment practices has the potential to create
a Hobson's choice for employers and thus to lead in practice to perverse results. If quotas and preferential treatment become the only
cost-effective means of avoiding expensive litigation and potentially
catastrophic liability, such measures will be widely adopted. The prudent employer will be careful to ensure that its programs are discussed
in euphemistic terms, but will be equally careful to ensure that the quo-

219.
220.

Id.
at 987.
Id. at 992.
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tas are met. Allowing the evolution of disparate impact analysis to lead
to this result would be contrary to Congress' •-221
clearly expressed intent,

and it should not be the effect of our decision today.
With this foundation laid, the Court was finally able to completely
dismantle the disparate impact theory in Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio.222 In Wards Cove, with Judge Kennedy then sitting, the Court

made it more difficult for plaintiffs to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination by adopting a more rigorous standard for
the use of statistical evidence and substantially easing the burden of de-

fendants to prove they meet the business necessity test.223
A question that has always intrigued me is why the Court in Wards
Cove did not completely overturn Griggs, if the majority of the Justices

subscribed to the view that the disparate treatment theory of discrimination should be the only theory of discrimination that represents this nation's policy on equality. The Court adopted that view in Washington v.
Davis with respect to claims based on the Equal Protection Clause.224
One answer might very well be that the Court would have had to overturn Washington v. Davis as well, because in Davis, the Court drew a
clear line of distinction between equal protection claims, where the disparate impact theory is not applicable, and Title VII claims, where the
Court recognized the legitimacy of disparate impact claims.225

221. Id. at 993.
222. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). See Robert Belton, The Dismantling of the Griggs DisparateImpact
Theory and the Future of Title VII: The Need for a Third Reconstruction, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
223, 224 (1990).
223. See Belton, supra note 222, at 240-41.
224. See supra note 209-11 and accompanying text.
225. In Washington v. Davis, the Court held that:
Under Title VII, Congress provided that when hiring and promotion practices disqualifying substantially disproportionate numbers of blacks are challenged, discriminatory purpose need not be proved, and that it is an insufficient response to demonstrate some rational basis for the challenged practices. It is necessary, in addition, that they be
"validated" in terms of job performance in any one of several ways, perhaps by ascertaining the minimum skill, ability, or potential necessary for the position at issue and determining whether the qualifying tests are appropriate for the selection of qualified applicants for the job in question. However, [as] this process proceeds, it involves a more
probing judicial review of, and less deference to, the seemingly reasonable acts of administrators and executives than is appropriate under the Constitution where special racial impact, without discriminatory purpose, is claimed. We are not disposed to adopt
this more rigorous standard for the purposes of applying the Fifth and the Fourteenth
Amendments in cases such as this.
426 U.S. 229, 246-48 (1976).
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V. THE CODIFICATION OR REBIRTH OF THE IMPACT THEORY

The Court's decision in Wards Cove was only one of a number of
cases the Supreme Court had decided during its 1989 Term that set into
motion the events that led to the codification of the disparate impact theory in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. In section 2(b) of the Findings to the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress found that "the decision of the Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio has weakened the
scope and effectiveness of Federal civil rights protections. 2 26 Congress'
first attempt to correct the Supreme Court decisions that had weakened
the scope and effectiveness of Title VII was the Civil Rights Act of
1990.227 President George Bush vetoed the Civil Rights Act of 1990 on
October 22, 1990.228 One of the most contentious issues in the debate
about the Civil Rights Act of 1990, and the later enacted legislation - the
Civil Right Act of 1991 - was whether the Griggs disparate impact theory should survive as a matter of law and national policy in the ongoing
effect to remedy discrimination in this nation. 229 Just over a year after
President Bush vetoed the Civil Rights Act of 1990, he signed into law
the Civil Rights Act of 1991. One of the prevailing views about the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 is that it would have met the same fate as the 1990
Act, but for the intervening controversial appointment of Justice Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court of the United States. 230 A week after
Justice Thomas was confirmed, the 1991 Act passed by overwhelming
majorities in both houses.2 3'
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 overturned or otherwise modified
twelve Supreme Court decisions that limited or severely curtailed civil
rights law.232 One of the most important provisions of the 1991 Civil
Rights Act is where Congress statutorily endorsed the disparate impact
theory,2 33 with the proviso that a related purpose was to "codify the concepts rf 'business necessity' and 'job related' enunciated by the Su226. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
227. See Cynthia L. Alexander, Note, The Defeat of the Civil Rights Act of 1990: Wading
Through the Rhetoric in Search of Compromise, 44 VAND. L. REV. 595, 596 (1991).
228. 136 CONG. REC. 31,828 (1990) (reprinting President Bush's veto message, which expressed concern that the disparate impact theory would lead to quota hiring).
229. See, Helen Dewar, Senate Upholds Civil Rights Veto, Dooming Measurefor 1990, WASH.
POST, Oct. 25, 1990, at A15.
230. See Ann Defroy, Bush Saw Gains in Deal, Officials Say: President Sought to Secure Domestic Victory, Avoid Veto Showdown, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 1991, at Al.
231. Seeid.atA7.
232. See Robert Belton, The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Future of Affirmative Action: A
PreliminaryAssessment, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 1085, 1085 n. 1 (1992).

233. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000).
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preme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co... and in other Supreme
Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio. 234
VI. SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Griggs has been described as "[t]he single most important Title VII
decision, both for the development of the law and in its impact on the
daily lives of American workers. 2 35 Without the Griggs disparate impact theory, I doubt seriously whether we could have made the same degree of progress under the disparate treatment theory of discrimination
alone, because the observations that the courts made in the early Title
VII cases are probably as true today: "[d]efendants of even minimal sophistication will neither admit discriminatory animus nor leave a paper
trail demonstrating it"' 236 and "[u]nless the employer is a latter-day
George Washington, employment discrimination
is as difficult to prove
237
as who chopped down the cherry tree.,
The present-effects-of-past-discrimination theory, which is the
theoretical predecessor of the disparate impact theory, began to open up
employment opportunities for the beneficiaries of Title VII in a meaningful way. Without the willingness of federal courts to entertain this
theory of discrimination, it is highly unlikely that the disparate impact
theory would have evolved as it did. The present-effects-of-pastdiscrimination theory is no longer viable under Title VII, but a variant of
that theory is found in the American with Disabilities Act of 1990.238
There appears to be a general consensus that we have now arrived
at a point in our effort to remedy discrimination in employment when we
can acknowledge that some progress has been made in implementing the
national commitment to the principle of equality. Nevertheless, we continue to disagree about the meaning of "equality" and the nature of "discrimination" as a social, moral, and political problem. We also disagree
about the extent to which discrimination on the basis of race, sex, national origin, religion, age and disability continues to shape employment

234. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3(2), 105 Stat. 1071, 1071 (1991).
235. H.R. REP. No. 102-40(l), pt. 1, at 23 (1991), reprinted in, 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549.
236. Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 697 (7th Cir. 1987).
237. Thornbrough v. Columbus & Greenville R.R., Co., 760 F.2d 633, 638 (5th Cir. 1985).
238. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(2) (2000). The ADA is the only federal statute that defines
"discrimination." Many of the theories of discrimination first developed under Title VII are included in the statutory definition of "discrimination" in the ADA, including the disparate impact
theory. Id. § 12112(b).
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and other decisions on the allocation of goods and services in our society. I doubt that this disagreement is likely to end soon.
A point that is often overlooked and too often overshadowed by the
Court's most recent equal protection affirmative action cases2 39 is that
Griggs provides the doctrinal foundations for legitimizing affirmative
action in the employment context, particularly in the private sector.2 40
The Court has thus adopted two different tests to determine the legality
of affirmative action plans. The strict scrutiny theory controls on determining the legality of affirmative action plans when challenged on equal
protection grounds. 24 1 A three-pronged test controls when the legality of
an affirmative action plan is challenged solely on Title VII grounds.242
Griggs opened up a completely new remedial approach to eradicating
unlawful discrimination in our society, including affirmative action.2 43
Griggs not only established the doctrinal foundations for the develop239. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244
(2003). In both of these cases, the Supreme Court endorsed the notion of racial diversity as a compelling state interest that supports affirmative action in higher education. The Court struck down the
affirmative action plan in Gratz, which involved an undergraduate race-based admission policy, but
upheld the affirmative action plan in Grutter,which involved a race-based admission policy used by
a law school.
240. See Belton, supra note 222, at 247-48.
241. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270; Grutter,539 U.S. at 308.
242. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 617 (1987) (dealing
with a plan adopted by a public employer); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 195 (1979)
(dealing with an affirmative action plan adopted by a union and a private employer).
243. There is no consensus on a definition of "affirmative action." As one commentator has
explained:
To its critics, affirmative action is both a euphemism for discrimination against white
men and a system that bureaucratizes the entire society at the cost of meritocratic decision making; it is a symbol for all that has gone wrong with American society since the
sixties. To its supporters, it is a first step towards remedying the crime of slavery and
eliminating the discriminatory preferences that have guaranteed white men the easiest
paths to wealth and power; it is a symbol ofjustice, and a promise of a future of hope.
David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Distinguishing Five Models of Affirmative Action, 4 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 42, 42 (1988-89). Previously, I have defined "affirmative action" as follows:
The affirmative action concept embodies a policy decision that some forms of raceconscious remedies are necessary to improve the social and economic status of blacks in
our society. That policy decision, however, cannot be isolated from the history that gave
rise to the affirmative action concept. When viewed in light of that history-decades of
blatant public and private discrimination against blacks as a group-the underlying
premise of affirmative action is manifest: If the chasm between "equality" as an abstract
proposition and "equality" as a reality is to be bridged, something more is needed than
mere prohibitions of positive acts of discrimination and the substitution of passive neutrality. That something more, the affirmative action concept dictates, must include raceconscious remedies.
Robert Belton, Discrimination and Affirmative Action.: An Analysis of Competing Theories of
Equality and Weber, 59 N.C. L. REv. 531, 534 (1981).
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ment of employment discrimination law generally, but also provided the
doctrinal transition from a human relations/administrative enforcement
model to a public law enforcement model. 44 Literally hundreds of minorities and women have benefited immensely from Griggs in ways that
probably could not have been accomplished under a human relations/administrative enforcement model or under an interpretation of Title VII that limited relief only to those 2parties
who could prove subjec45
conduct.
discriminatory
intentional
tive,
We are witnessing a number of record-breaking class action settlements in employment discrimination cases. Some of the more wellknown and highly visible settlements include cases against Shoney's,
Texaco, and Coca-Cola. 246 It seems, without a doubt, that the disparate
impact theory may be a factor that is either in the forefront or in the
background of these settlements.
Now that Congress has codified the disparate impact theory, a question raised is whether this codification is likely to have the same effect in
the future as it has had in the past. In addressing this question, one commentator has identified the following reasons for what seems to be present underutilization of the theory.247 The first is that the disparate impact theory may not be as attractive as the disparate treatment theory
because compensatory and punitive damages are not recoverable under
the disparate impact theory.248 The second is that the impact theory is
"inherently a class-based theory and class actions are difficult, if not impossible, for private parties to undertake unless they involve the possibility of very large damage awards.,, 249 The third is that the world has
changed since Title VII has been on the books; the employers now know

244. See Robert Belton, Causation and Burden-Shifting Doctrinesin Employment Discrimination Law Revisited: Some Thoughts on Hopkins and Wards Cove, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1360, 1403
(1990); see also L. Camille H~bert, Redefining the Burdens of Proofin Title VII Litigation: Will the
DisparateImpact Theory Survive Wards Cove and the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 32 B.C. L. REV. 1,
45-46 (1990) (noting that Griggs sparked a debate in Congress between administrative enforcement
and public law enforcement).
245. See generally Robert Belton, A ComparativeReview of Publicand Private Enforcement of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 VAND. L. REV. 905, 906-07 (1978) (discussing how judicial enforcement gave those injured by a Title VII violation meaningful relief).
246. See generally Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination: The Nature of Class Action
Employment Discrimination and Its Effects, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1249 (2003) (citing the multimillion dollar settlements by these major corporations).
247. Elaine Shoben, DisparateImpact Theory in Employment Discrimination: What's Griggs
Still Good For? What Not?, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 597, 598 (2004).
248. See id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 198 1a(b)(l) (2000) (allowing recovery of punitive damages
if malice or reckless indifference is proven).
249. Shoben, supra note 247, at 598.
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the rules, and "the Griggs revolution has been spectacular and employment practices across America have been influenced by the holding. 2 5 °
The fourth is that the disparate impact theory is under attack as illustrated by the split in the circuits on whether the theory applies to claims
arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. 251 The theory
is not dead, but what happens to it in the future remains to be seen. And,
it should be noted, that developments of the theory in the future will not
necessarily be left to the federal government because states are beginning to adopt the theory as well.252
Griggs is not without its critics. The disparate impact theory, like
the Court's decision in Brown, has generated an ongoing judicial and
scholarly debate about the legitimacy of the theory and the Court's underlying rationale. As one scholar stated, "missing from the Burger
Court's opinions was a clear explanation of the theory underlying disparate impact law. Was the theory bottomed on the existence of past or
present discrimination against minorities?, 25 3 Another scholar has argued that Griggs was wrongly decided because Congress intended to
prohibit only disparate treatment discrimination.25 4 As with the Brown
decision, much of the criticism of Griggs is grounded, at bottom, on the
ongoing debate about the meaning of equality, and the debate about the
215
meaning of equality goes back to the very beginning of this country.
The efforts of the Legal Defense Fund in its employment discrimination
litigation campaign were an attempt to reshape the contours of the de-

250.

Id.

251.

Id. at 599. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d

183 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 1724 (2004), to resolve the circuit split.
252. See, e.g., Thomas v. Anchorage Tel. Util., 741 P.2d 618, 628 (Ala. 1987); Racine Unified
Sch. Dist. v. Labor & Indus. Comm'n., 476 N.W.2d 707, 718 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991).
253. Brian K. Landsberg, Race and the Rehnquist Court, 66 TUL. L. REv. 1267, 1281 (1992).
254. Michael Gold, Griggs' Folly: An Essay on the Theory, Problems, and the Origins of Adverse Impact Definition of Employment Discrimination and a Recommendation for Reform, 7

INDUS. REL. L.J. 429 (1985). Professor Richard Epstein, one of the harshest critics of employment
discrimination law, has argued that, "[i]f in 1964 any sponsor of the Civil Rights Act had admitted
Title VII on the ground that it adopted the disparate impact test read into it by the Supreme Court in
Griggs, Title VII would have gone down to thundering defeat." RICHARD EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN
GROUND: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS 197 (1992).
255. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 13-62 (5th ed. 2004). Pro-

fessor Derrick Bell, who many deem to be the "father" of critical race theory, has articulated several
reasons to explain the unsteady progress this country has made in dealing with racial injustice. His
first theory is the cyclical nature of racial progress. The second is that significant racial progress for
African Americans occurs when the goals of African Americans coincide with the perceived needs
of whites. The third is that serious differences between the races are often resolved through compromise that sacrifices the rights of African Americans. See id. at 18.
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bate about equality. Understanding the history of the litigation strategy
that led to the Griggs decision is essential to reformulating that debate.
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